ERIC JONATHAN YU v. CAROLINE YU
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial Court. The petition contains a prayer for the award of sole custody of his daughter Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The CA dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for becoming moot and academic. Caroline Tanchay-Yu, on the other hand, filed before the RTC Pasay a petition for habeas corpus, with a prayer for the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca.
Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the RTC Pasay or before the RTC Pasig
HELD:
Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in both actions – whether it would serve the best interest of Bianca to be in the custody of Eric rather than Caroline or vice versa.
Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is Caroline‘s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of Caroline‘s fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other, are present.
By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.
The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code is when “such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings,” which is not the case here.
The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate action criterion guides this Court in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.
The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the express provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
