Case Digest: PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO

PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO

395 SCRA 117 (2003), THIRD DIVISION

Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person and property of her sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of herself anymore due to her old age, general weakness, and suffering from a mini-stroke thereby requiring the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in various enterprises.

Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta‘s close friend for more than six decades, opposed the petition. She claims that Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her person and property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Julieta to be “incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property” and Gustilo was appointed to be her guardian. The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself

HELD:

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.

In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals‘ basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between Julieta and Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,

2. The Court of Appeals‘ erred in holding that there is no showing that Amparo is hostile to the best interest of Julieta, and

3. Julieta Ledesma‘s appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of Goyena‘s position require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. The Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena claims that the petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record.

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort: “As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.”

In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Goyena‘s assertion that Amparo‘s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta‘s properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.