Case Digest: CARMELO C. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.

CARMELO C. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.

520 SCRA 332 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Carmelo Bernardo (Bernardo) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), for issuing six postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500 to F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.(Ylang Ylang Mktg). The MeTc rendered judgment finding Bernardo guilty of the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC judgment.Bernardo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). He filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsel‘s receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion Partial Reconsideration.

The CA granted the motion for extension of time but only for 15 days. Apparently unaware of the CA order, he used up the 30-day extension sought and filed his petition. Hence, the appellate court denied his petition having been filed 15 days later and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other pertinent and material documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in granting only 15 days extension

HELD:

Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an “additional period of 15 days only” within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a “further extension” not to exceed 15 days may be granted “for the most compelling reason,” petitioner had no basis to assume that his request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the length of time they pray for.

The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides that “[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.”