Case Digest: CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, et al., v. BENJAMIN CO, et al.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, et al., v. BENJAMIN CO, et al.

565 SCRA 600 (2008), SECOND DIVISION

China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) sold two parcels of land situated in Pampanga to Spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (Spouses Castro) and Richard and Editha Nogoy (Spouses Nogoy). Bordering the lot was a residential property owned by Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.

Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, which included constructing a wall along the border of their property. Engineer Dale Olea, an independent contractor, constructed a wall that blocked side access to the Spouses Nogoy‘s and Castro‘s property. Spouses Nogoy and Castro communicated with Co, asking for a halt in the activities because the construction closed the only means of ingress and egress of their property.

Co told the spouses that the construction could not be halted since the same was almost finished, and that the disputed construction did not block the right of way of the two spouses‘ property. The spouses thus filed a writ of preliminary injunction to temporarily stop the building activity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an injunction can be granted by mere claim of right of way

HELD:

Spouses Nogoy and Castro failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the construction of the wall. The spouses have not clearly shown that their rights have been violated and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for and that irreparable damage would be suffered by them if an injunction is not issued.

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the spouses Nogoy and Castro must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

While the Spouses Nogoy and Castro correctly argue that certain requirements must be observed before encumbrances, in this case the condition of the lot’s registration as being subject to the law, may be discharged and before road lots may be appropriated gratuity assuming that the lot in question was indeed one, enjoy the presumption of regularity and the legal requirements for the removal of the memorandum annotated on Co‘s lot are presumed to have been followed.