HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
The case was initiated on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages.
ISSUE: WON the donation was mortis causa
NO. the donation was inter vivos. None of the characteristics of mortis causa is discernible in the deeds of donation, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner’s share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation.
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase “that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective” (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion”). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor’s death, when full title would become vested in the donees.
That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such consideration corroborates the
express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities of testaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.
