PATRICIA I. TIONGSON VS NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

PATRICIA I. TIONGSON

VS

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
558 SCRA 56 (2008)

In a situation where a government agency, in this case the National Housing Authority, took possession of properties belonging to private individuals for purposes of expropriation and the laws by virtue of which such government agency expropriated the subject properties were subsequently declared to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the determination of just compensation should be reckoned from the date of filing the complaint for expropriation and not from the time of actual taking of the properties.

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took possession in 1978, for purposes of expropriation, of properties belonging to petitioners Patricia L. Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. The two P.D.’s were thereafter declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. On September 14, 1987, the NHA filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Tiongson, et al. for expropriation of parcels of land which were covered by P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670.

The RTC held that the determination of just compensation of the properties should be reckoned from the date of filing of NHA’s petition or on September 14, 1987. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s orders and held that the just compensation should be based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be reckoned from the time of the taking of the property or on the filing of the complaint

HELD:
In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the determination of just compensation should be reckoned from NHA’s taking of the properties in 1978, the appellate court simply relied on Annex ―C‖ of NHA’s petition before it, the Order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of the trial court, and thus concluded that ―the parties admitted that [NHA] took possession of the subject properties as early as 1978.‖ The appellate court reached that conclusion, despite its recital of the antecedents of the case including Tiongson, sustained moves, even before the trial court, in maintaining that the reckoning of just compensation should be from the date of filing of the petition for expropriation on September 14, 1987.

The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in NHA’s Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC constitute judicial admissions of NHA—that it possessed the subject properties until this Court’s declaration, in its above-stated Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21, 1987, that P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of the properties of petitioners in 1978 was unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. These admissions, the appellate court either unwittingly failed to consider or escaped its notice.

Tiongson, et al., even brought to the appellate court’s attention, in their Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of June 16, 1999, the fact that they had called the trial court’s attention to NHA’s allegation-admissions in the body and prayer of its petition. But the appellate court, by resolution of October 7, 1999, denied petitioners’ motion upon the ground that it raised substantially the same issues that were already considered and passed upon in arriving at its decision. The appellate court’s June 16, 1999 decision glaringly shows, however, that the matter of judicial admissions of NHA in the body and prayer in its petition were not considered by it.

Vis-a-vis the factual backdrop of the case, the just compensation of Tiongson, et al.’s properties must be determined ―as of the date of . . . the filing of [NHA’s] complaint‖ on September 14, 1987.‖