Case Digest: JOSE C. SABERON v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG

JOSE C. SABERON v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG

561 SCRA 493 (2008)

Utterances, petitions and motions are considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, only if they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Petitioner Jose C. Saberon charged respondent Atty. Fernando T. Larong of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

The Investigation Commissioner found Larong guilty of grave misconduct, Saberon nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. On the other hand, Larong seeks for the Court‘s declaration that the questioned allegations were privileged communication. He submits that the statements, while opening up a lawyer to possible administrative sanction for the use of intemperate language under the Canons of Professional Responsibility, should not be stripped of their privileged nature.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Larong is guilty of grave misconduct

HELD:

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

Respecting Larong’s argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Thus, while Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit Larong’s disbarment. In light of Larong’s apologies, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.