Case Digest: HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 438 SCRA 221 (2004)

HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 438 SCRA 221 (2004)

Henry Barrera, the Mayor of the Municipality of Candelaria, Zambales was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. An administrative case was also filed against Barrera before the Office of the Ombudsman which recommended that he be faulted for abuse of authority and be penalized with suspension from office without pay for six (6) months. Barrera filed a motion but it was denied. He thus filed a petition for review of the Ombudsman decision before Court of Appeals which denied the same. The Sandiganbayan ordered Barrerra‘s preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in placing Henry Equiban Barrera under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days.

HELD:

Henry Barrera admits in his memorandum filed before the Supreme Court that upon his receipt of the resolution directing his preventive suspension, he started serving the same. The issue has thus been rendered moot and academic. Besides, the Sandiganbayan, by Decision dismissed Criminal Cases on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
At this juncture then, a determination of whether the preventive suspension under Section 13 of Rule 3019 is mandatory and automatic would not have any practical effect on the existing controversy. En passant, if the administrative case filed against Barrera has been terminated also in his favor, he may invoke Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
It is Barrera‘s contention that Section 13, R.A. 3019 should not be taken in isolation but should be viewed in light of the rationale behind the suspension, the purpose being to prevent the officer or employee from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. And, so Barrera maintains, since the prosecution failed to prove, if not substantially allege that he is abusing the prerogatives of the office, intimidating possible witnesses and/or tampering with documentary evidence during the pendency of the cases against him, the suspension order should not have been issued. It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official “shall be suspended from office” while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. There are no ifs and buts about it. The court has neither the discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan so teaches.