J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICES VS NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION and WARLITO E. DUMALAOG

J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICES

VS
NATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION and WARLITO E. DUMALAOG
561 SCRA 675 (2008)

A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into.

Worked as a cook on aboard vessels plying overseas, Warlito E. Dumalaog was employed as a cook on board vessels plying overseas. He filed a pro-forma complaint on March 4,2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against J-Phil Marine, Inc., its then president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for failure to attach to the petition all material documents and for defective verification and certification. Consequently, a petition was filed before the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the respondent entered into a compromise agreement and signed Quitclaims and Release. The same has been subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter. Accordingly, the case was dismissed.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the respondent, without his counsel, is valid

HELD:
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to Dumalaoag’s contention, the employee’s counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement.

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation. The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The circumstances of this case indicate that Dumalaoag’s counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement.