SPOUSES PONCIANO AYA-AY, SR. and CLEMENCIA AYA-AY VS ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP. and MAGNA MARINE INC.

SPOUSES PONCIANO AYA-AY, SR. and CLEMENCIA AYA-AY

VS

ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP. and MAGNA MARINE INC.
481 SCRA 282 (2006)

Death benefits shall be awarded only when the cause of death of the employee was proved by substantial evidence to be reasonably connected with his work or his working conditions.

Ponciano Aya-ay Jr. is a seaman engaged by Arpaphil Shipping Corporation to work under an 11-month contract of employment for co-respondent Magna Marine Inc. On board the vessel and while performing his work, Aya-ay met an eye injury thereby requiring him to undergo a corneal transplant. Upon mutual consent of Magna Marine and Aya-ay, Aya-ay was repatriated to Manila. While waiting for an eye donor, Aya-ay died. The death certificate indicates that the immediate cause of his death is cerebro-vascular accident (CVA) commonly known as stroke.

Petitioners Ponciano Aya-ay Sr. and Clemencia Aya-ay, parents of Aya-ay, now claims for death compensation benefits from Arpaphil and Magna Marine, which the latter rejected.

Both the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) denied their claims. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Aya-ay are entitled to claim death benefits under POEA Standard Employment Contract

HELD:
Part II, Section C, Nos. 1 and 3 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels provide, among other things that compensation and benefits may be availed of by the worker provided he/she dies during the term of the contract or he/she has died as a result of injury or illness during the term of the employment.

Upon mutual consent of Aya-ay and Arpaphil and Magna Marine, he was on July 5, 1995 repatriated on account of his eye injury. Thus his employment had been effectively terminated on that particular date. At all events, under the October 15, 1994 Contract of Employment, Aya-ay ceased to be an employee on September 26, 1995, hence, he was no longer an employee when he died on December 1, 1995.

It is, therefore, crucial to determine whether Aya-ay died as a result of, or in relation to, the eye injury he suffered during the term of his employment. If the injury is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk, of his death for which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for said death.

Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a) the cause of Aya-ay’s death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded.