Case Digest: FELICITO G. SANSON et al. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN BON FING SY

FELICITO G. SANSON et al. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN BON FING SY

401 SCRA 349 (2003), THIRD DIVISION

Petitioners Felicito G. Sanson (Felicito), his sister Celedonia (Celedonia) Sanson-Saquin, Eduardo Montinola Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Sanson, et al) claimed that the deceased Juan Bon Fing Sy was indebted to them. Hence, in their capacity as creditors, they filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.

During the hearing, Felicito and Celedonia testified in favor of each other‘s claim, and Jade Montinola testified in favor of her husband‘s (Eduardo) and her mother-in-law‘s (Angeles) claim. Their testimonies were supported by checks allegedly issued by the deceased before his death. These testimonies and evidences were countered by Melencia T. Sy, the surviving spouse and appointed administratrix of the deceased‘s estate by invoking the Dead Man‘s Statute which according to her, disqualifies the witnesses from testifying.

The RTC, upon finding that the Dead Man‘s Statute does not apply to the witnesses ruled in favor of Sanson, et al. Thus, ordering the administratrix to pay in due course the respective amount due to Sanson et al. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside RTC‘s decision. Hence, this appeal to the High Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Dead Man‘s Statute applies to the witnesses presented by Sanson, et al.

HELD:

As for the administratrix‘s invocation of the Dead Man‘s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.(Underscoring supplied) Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence the checks.

As to the second assigned error, Sanson, et al. argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other‘s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man‘s Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review.

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each other‘s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of “parties or assignors of parties to a case.” Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other‘s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)

But Sanson‘s and Celedonia‘s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia‘s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson‘s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other‘s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man‘s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia‘s account, she “knows” the signature of the deceased.

While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that “the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person” x x x not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with the naked eye of the deceased‘s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.

In fine, as Sanson, et al. have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.