Case Digest: SOUTHECH DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al. v. NATIONAL LABORS COMMISSION, et al.

SOUTHECH DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al. v. NATIONAL LABORS COMMISSION, et al.

448 SCRA 64, 12 January 2005, THIRD DIVISION

Respondents, Rodrigo Lapez Sr. and Reynaldo Gamutan (Lapez and Gamutan) filed an illegal dismissal suit and such other monetary claims against Southech Development Corp. (Southech) with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case due to lack of merit but granted the payment of the 13th month and service incentive leave pay as Southech failed to prove payment thereof.

Corollary, counsel for Lapez and Gamutan appealed the said decision with the NLRC but was subsequently dismissed by the latter for non-compliance with the 10 day prescriptive period for filing an appeal. Delay was apparently caused by Lapez and Gamutan‘s counsel who was attending to other cases when the said notice of the decision was received.

The Court of Appeals however, set aside the dismissal and enjoined the NLRC to give due course to the case in the interest of substantial justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent‘s reason of delay is acceptable to excuse the procedural lapse

HELD:

The Court has given imprimatur to the NLRC‘s disregard of procedural lapse in filing a belated appeal where there is an “acceptable reason” to excuse the tardiness. Among the reasons which have been recognized as acceptable are: (a.) counsel‘s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the Labor Arbiter‘s decision that “the aggrieved party may appeal…within 10 working days”, (b.) fundamental consideration of substantial justice, (c.) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision, and (d.) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.

The explanation-excuse of respondent‘s counsel that “at the time copy of the labor arbiter‘s decision was received at his law office, he was attending to his cases in…his home province…”, does not lie however. The receipt by respondent‘s counsel-law office of the labor arbiter‘s decision bound respondents, its clients. And the failure or negligence of respondent‘s counsel to timely lodge the appeal bound them.

While the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the client‘s liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, respondents have not shown, nay alleged, why a relaxation of the rule is called for. On the contrary, the uncontroverted facts of the case incline against respondents.