Case Digest: CONRADO QUESADA et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

CONRADO QUESADA et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

581 SCRA 362 (2009), SECOND DIVISION

Epitacio Asuncion, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners Conrado Quesada, et al. was the owner of the subject lot. One-and-a-half (1 ½) hectares of the lot were leased to one Claro San Luis. The lot is separated from the land occupied by Querubin Derequito, predecessor-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Ildefonso Derequito. Querubin converted a portion of the Balabag River into a fish pond and occupied a portion of the lot leased to San Luis.

Querubin later filed a complaint for forcible entry against San Luis. The Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered a decision in favor of San Luis. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court but the same was not implemented.
The contract of lease of San Luis expired in 1977. After Querubin died, the Heirs of Querubin succeeded in the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the questioned portion of the lot. San Luis, together with Quesada et al., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint to revive the judgment for forcible entry which was decided in favor of San Luis. The RTC ruled in favor of Quesada et al.

The heirs of Querubin filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied due course since it was filed beyond the reglemantary period. A writ of execution was thus issued. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of the heirs of Querubin and held that prescription had set in as 30 years had “already passed” from the time the decision in the forcible entry case became final and executory and that the said decision “may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to the heirs of Querubin‘s petition anent the earlier denial of said their Appeal

HELD:

One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Heirs of Querubin had the remedy of appeal when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Quesada et al. Heirs of Querubin did in fact file a Notice of Appeal, which was denied due course, however, because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Having lost the remedy of appeal, they should not have been allowed by the Court of Appeals to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Respecting the issue of prescription, contrary to the heir‘s contention, the action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not prescribed. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975 and the motion for reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976. A writ of execution was in fact issued.

The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to or on or about September 15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681 the action for revival of judgment on August 26, 1985, was well within the 10-year prescriptive period. STRANGELY, the appellate court, in its challenged decision of May 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the trial court‘s decision up to the promulgation of its (the appellate court‘s) decision on May 31, 2006, hence, its ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial court‘s decision.