MEANING OF “CAUSING UNDUE INJURY”

          The act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of causing any undue injury to any part, although there may be instances where both elements concur.  (Santiago vs Garchitorena, et al., 2 Dec. 93).

          In Mejoroda v Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court has ruled that the offender in causing undue injury does not refer only to those who are in charge of giving permits, licenses or concessions but all acts of public officers or employees which have caused undue injury to others.

ELEMENTS OF NEGLECT OF DUTY UNDER

SEC. 3 OF RA 3019

1. the offender is a public officer;

1. the said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made upon him;

1. reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him;

1. such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party or discriminating against another.  Coronado v Sandiganbayan.

WHERE PUBLIC OFFICER ACTED

WITH MANIFEST PARTIALITY,

EVIDENT BAD FAITH, OR INEXCUSABLE

NEGLIGENCE

          Sec. 3.         Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

          xxx    xxx    xxx

(e).    Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF RA 3019

REQUIRES PROOF OF THE FOLLOWING

FACTS, VIZ:

1. the accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;

1. the public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;

1. the public officer acted with manifest partiality evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and

1. his action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.

CAUSING UNDUE INJURY UNDER SEC. 3,

LETTER (e) OF RA 3019.  MEANING.

          Section 3 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officer declared unlawful.  Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful.  We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last inclusion of officers and employees of offices or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of “public officer” may not come within the term.  It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting license or permits or other concessions. (Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 399).

SUSPENSION UNDER R.A. 3019 MANDATORY

BUT COURTS ARE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE

WHETHER INFORMATION IS VALID OR NOT

It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).In the same case, the Court held that “as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90) days.”   (Conducto v. Monzon;  A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998)

PUBLIC OFFICER MAY BE SUSPENDED FROM HIS PRESENT POSITION EVEN IF THE CRIME WHICH HE IS BEING CHARGED WAS COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM

Judge Monzon’s contention denying complainant’s Motion for Suspension because “offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for removal during the present term” is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that “the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases . . .”

Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that “The ruling, therefore, that ‘when the people have elected a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any’ refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case”

Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during Maghirang’s first term as barangay chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 during his second term, his re-election is not a bar to his suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case.   (Conducto v. Monzon;  A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998)