Case Digest: DELA PENA V. AVILA

DELA PENA V. AVILA 

G.R. No. 187490, [February 08, 2012]

FACTS:

Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan obligation.

Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As such Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.

Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.

FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.

Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied the material allegations, maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive.

RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.

HELD:

No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.

RATIO:

Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property ofthe marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.

In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. “Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.”

As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.