CHIANG KAI SHEK SCHOOL, petitioner,
VS
COURT OF APPEALS and FAUSTINA FRANCO OH, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58028 [April 18, 1989]
Facts:
Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years. She was told she had no assignment for the next semester. For no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed from her work. As a result, she sued and demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.
The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal, its decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable while absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, the school then came to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government
Ruling:
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws.Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent’s complaint. There should also be no question that having contracted with the private respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.” As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent’s dismissal.
