Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery of the testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sir’s book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:
The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
