CASE DIGEST: PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILS V LAGUESMA

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILS

VS

LAGUESMA

207 SCRA 392

[March 18, 1992]

FACTS

-The CBA between the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI and Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU) was about to expire. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

-Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the petition.

-Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

-Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted 35 days after the filing of the petition. The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book

V of the Implementing Rules, which requires that the signatures be submitted upon filing of petition.This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter.

-PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election., DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP’s appeal.

-Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was ratified by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

ISSUE/S

WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in application of Art 256 of the Labor Code

HELD

YES

-Pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and collective bargaining, “the constant and unwavering policy of this Court” has been “to require a certification election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective bargaining representative.”

-The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

-In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

-It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election.

-The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.

-It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-organization and collective bargaining.

-Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers.

-Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.

-There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a certification election.

-Any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers must be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial justice.

Disposition

Petition GRANTED.