Case Digest: GELLIA ALTIZO, et al. v. BRYC-V DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

GELLIA ALTIZO, et al. v. BRYC-V DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 203 SCRA 544 (2006)

Occupation by mere tolerance by a corporation ceases upon transfer of title of the property in favor of another corporation.

Sea Foods Corporation Inc. (SFC) was the registered owner of Lot 300 situated in Zamboanga City. It appears that in the early 60s, herein petitioners Gellia Altizo et al. started to occupy a portion of Lot 300.
In 1989, Altizo et al., together with other occupants of a portion of of the said land, organized themselves into an association, United Muslim Christian Urban Poor Association, Inc. (UMCUPAI), for the purpose of negotiating the sale of the lands they occupy in their favor. SFC and UMCUPAI subsequently entered into an agreement where SFC signified its intent to sell to UMCUPAI Lot 300 and the latter‘s intention to buy the said lot at a stipulated price.
SFC later subdivided Lot 300 into three lots: Lot 300-A, Lot 300-B and Lot 300-C. Lot 300-A was thereafter sold to UMCAPAI. It then sold to BRYC-V Development Corporation (BRYC-V) Lot 300-C where Altizo et al. had constructed their houses. Over the objection of UMCUPAI, BRYC-V was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-121523. BRYC-V later asked, verbally and in writing, Altizo et al. to vacate Lot 300-C but they refused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners Altizo et al. has the right of continued possession based on the agreement they entered into with SFC

HELD:

Altizo et al.‘s occupation of subject lot was on the mere tolerance of the previous owner SFC. Such right to occupy ceased when the SFC sold the subject lot to BRYC-V which has been issued a title thereto, hence, entitled to its possession. Altizo et al. having withheld possession of subject lot, despite BRYCV‘s demand, they have become deforciant occupants.

Altizo et al.‘s claim that they can continue to possess the subject lot, they having been granted by the previous owner preferential right to buy Lot 300 under the Letter of Intent, does not lie. No right of possession, which is the only issue in an unlawful detainer case, arises from such Letter of Intent which, as it clearly states, merely signifies intent to, not actually transfer ownership.