Aleatory Contracts; Gambling (2004)
A. Mr. ZY lost P100,000 in a card game called Russian poker, but he had no more cash to pay in full the winner at the time the session ended. He promised to pay PX, the winner, two weeks thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two months, so PX filed in court a suit to collect the amount of P50,000 that he won but remained unpaid. Will the collection suit against ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn a suit against PX to recover the P100,000 that her husband lost? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. 1) The suit by PX to collect the balance of what he won from ZY will not prosper. Under Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he has won in a game of chance. Although poker may depend in part on ability, it is fundamentally a game of chance.
2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or community property, the wife of ZY could sue to recover it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code provides that losses in gambling or betting are borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. Hence, conjugal or community funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the money were exclusive property of ZY, his wife may also sue to recover it under Article 2016 of the Civil Code if she and the family needed the money for support.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER (2):
A. (2). Mrs. ZY cannot file a suit to recover what her husband lost. Art 2014 of the Civil Code provides that any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost. This means that only he can file the suit. Mrs. ZY cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in the absolute community property or conjugal partnership of gains, because under Art. 117(7} of the Family Code, losses are borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. Therefore, these cannot be charged against absolute community property or conjugal partnership of gains. This being so, Mrs. ZY has no interest in law to prosecute and recover as she has no legal standing in court to do so.
Conditional Obligations (2000)
Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will pass the bar examinations. When his grandson passed the said examinations, Pedro refused to give the car on the ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he correct or not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it does not depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it would be valid because it depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of the debtor (the donor).
Conditional Obligations (2003)
Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the obligation demandable in each case?
a) If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;
b) If the debtor promises to pay when he likes;
c) If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer;
d) If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die within one year.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so (Article 1180, NCC). When the creditor knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the period, and when the definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes demandable 9Article 1197, NCC).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The obligation “to pay when he likes” is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is subject to the sole will of the debtor and, therefore the conditional obligation is void. (Article 1182, NCC).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(c) The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the future and uncertain event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the will of the debtor but also on other factors outside the debtor’s control.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(d) The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does not die within one year (Article 1185, NCC).
Conditional Obligations; Promise (1997)
In two separate documents signed by him, Juan Valentino “obligated” himself each to Maria and to Perla, thus – ‘To Maria, my true love, I obligate myself to give you my one and only horse when I feel like It.” – and – ‘To Perla, my true sweetheart, I obligate myself to pay you the P500.00 I owe you when I feel like it.” Months passed but Juan never bothered to make good his promises. Maria and Perla came to consult you on whether or not they could recover on the basis of the foregoing settings. What would your legal advice be?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan for the latter to make good his promise. [This is because a promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to recover especially when she has not suffered damages resulting from such promise. A promise does not create an obligation on the part of Juan because it is not something which arises from a contract, law, quasi-contracts or quasi- delicts (Art, 1157)]. Under Art. 1182, Juan’s promise to Maria is void because a conditional obligation depends upon the sole will of the obligor.
As regards Perla, the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the promise to pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when his means permits him to do so, and is deemed to be one with an indefinite period under Art. 1180. Hence the amount is recoverable after Perla asks the court to set the period as provided by Art. 1197, par. 2.
Conditional Obligations; Resolutory Condition (1999)
In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and lot which is being rented by another person, if Eva passes the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed said examinations.
(a) Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot to another before Eva passed the 1998 bar examinations, is such sale valid? Why?
(b) Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said house and lot, is she entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the sale to the other person is valid as a sale with a resolutory condition because what operates as a suspensive condition for Eva operates a resolutory condition for the buyer.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANS WER:
Yes, the sale to the other person is valid. However, the buyer acquired the property subject to a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence, upon Eva’s passing the Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated and Eva acquired ownership of the property.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale to another person before Eva could buy it from Manuel is valid, as the contract between Manuel and Eva is a mere promise to sell and Eva has not acquired a real right over the land assuming that there is a price stipulated in the contract for the contract to be considered a sale and there was delivery or tradition of the thing sold.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) No, she is not entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel because at the time they accrued and were collected, Eva was not yet the owner of the property.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Assuming that Eva is the one entitled to buy the house and lot, she is not entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the bar examinations. Whether it is a contract of sale or a contract to sell, reciprocal prestations are deemed imposed A for the seller to deliver the object sold and for the buyer to pay the price. Before the happening of the condition, the fruits of the thing and the interests on the money are deemed to have been mutually compensated under Article 1187.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Art. 1164, there is no obligation on the part of Manuel to deliver the fruits (rentals) of the thing until the obligation to deliver the thing arises. As the suspensive condition has not been fulfilled, the obligation to sell does not arise.
Extinguishment; Assignment of Rights (2001)
The sugar cane planters of Batangas entered into a long- term milling contract with the Central Azucarera de Don Pedro Inc. Ten years later, the Central assigned its rights to the said milling contract to a Taiwanese group which would take over the operations of the sugar mill. The planters filed an action to annul the said assignment on the ground that the Taiwanese group was not registered with the Board of Investments. Will the action prosper or not? Explain briefly.
(Note: The question presupposes knowledge and requires the application of the provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code, which properly belongs to Commercial law.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper not on the ground invoked but on the ground that the farmers have not given their consent to the assignment. The milling contract imposes reciprocal obligations on the parties. The sugar central has the obligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers while the latter have the obligation to deliver their sugar cane to the sugar central. As to the obligation to mill the sugar cane, the sugar central is a debtor of the farmers. In assigning its rights under the contract, the sugar central will also transfer to the Taiwanese its obligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers. This will amount to a novation of the contract by substituting the debtor with a third party. Under Article 1293 of the Civil Code, such substitution cannot take effect without the consent of the creditor. The formers, who are creditors as far as the obligation to mill their sugar cane is concerned, may annul such assignment for not having given their consent thereto.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The assignment is valid because there is absolute freedom to transfer the credit and the creditor need not get the consent of the debtor. He only needs to notify him.
Extinguishment; Cause of Action (2004)
TX filed a suit for ejectment against BD for non-payment of condominium rentals amounting to P150,000. During the pendency of the case, BD offered and TX accepted the full amount due as rentals from BD, who then filed a motion to dismiss the ejectment suit on the ground that the action is already extinguished. Is BD’s contention correct? Why or why not? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
BD’s contention is not correct. TX can still maintain the suit for ejectment. The acceptance by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears even during the pendency of the ejectment case does not constitute a waiver or abandonment of the ejectment case. (Spouses Clutario v. CA, 216 SCRA 341 [1992]).
Extinguishment; Compensation (2002)
Stockton is a stockholder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his shares in Core Corp. In view of a court suit that Core Corp. has filed against him for damages in the amount of P10 million, plus attorney’s fees of P 1 million, as a result of statements published by Stockton which are allegedly defamatory because it was calculated to injure and damage the corporation’s reputation and goodwill.
The articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right of first refusal in favor of the corporation. Accordingly, Stockton gave written notice to the corporation of his offer to sell his shares of P 10 million. The response of Core corp. was an acceptance of the offer in the exercise of its rights of first refusal, offering for the purpose payment in form of compensation or set-off against the amount of damages it is claiming against him, exclusive of the claim for attorney’s fees. Stockton rejected the offer of the corporation, arguing that compensation between the value of the shares and the amount of damages demanded by the corporation cannot legally take effect. Is Stockton correct? Give reason for your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
Stockton is correct. There is no right of compensation between his price of P10 million and Core Corp.’s unliquidated claim for damages. In order that compensation may be proper, the two debts must be liquidated and demandable. The case for the P 10million damages being still pending in court, the corporation has as yet no claim which is due and demandable against Stockton.
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
The right of first refusal was not perfected as a right for the reason that there was a conditional acceptance equivalent to a counter-offer consisting in the amount of damages as being credited on the purchase price. Therefore, compensation did not result since there was no valid right of first refusal (Art. 1475 & 1319, NCC)
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
Even [if] assuming that there was a perfect right of first refusal, compensation did not take place because the claim is unliquidated.
Extinguishment; Compensation vs. Payment (1998)
Define compensation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation, and distinguish it from payment.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
COMPENSATION is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount, the obligations of those persons who in their own right are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other (Tolentino, 1991 ed., p.365, citing 2 Castan 560 and Francia vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 753). It involves the simultaneous balancing of two obligations in order to extinguish them to the extent in which the amount of one is covered by that of the other. (De Leon, 1992 ed., p.221, citing 8 Manresa 401).
PAYMENT means not only delivery of money but also performance of an obligation (Article 1232, Civil Code). In payment, capacity to dispose of the thing paid and capacity to receive payment are required for debtor and creditor, respectively: in compensation, such capacity is not necessary, because the compensation operates by law and not by the act of the parties. In payment, the performance must be complete; while in compensation there may be partial extinguishment of an obligation (Tolentino, supra)
Extinguishment; Compensation/Set-Off; Banks (1998)
X, who has a savings deposit with Y Bank in the sum of P1,000,000.00 incurs a loan obligation with the said Bank in the sum of P800,000.oo which has become due. When X tries to withdraw his deposit, Y Bank allows only P200.000.00 to be withdrawn, less service charges, claiming that compensation has extinguished its obligation under the savings account to the concurrent amount of X’s debt. X contends that compensation is improper when one of the debts, as here, arises from a contract of deposit. Assuming that the promissory note signed by X to evidence the loan does not provide for compensation between said loan and his savings deposit, who is correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Y bank is correct. An. 1287, Civil Code, does not apply. All the requisites of Art. 1279, Civil Code are present. In the case of Gullas vs. PNB (62 Phil. 519),the Supreme Court held: “The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and deposit. These portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other. In this connection, it has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor, x x x As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor.” Hence, compensation took place between the mutual obligations of X and Y bank.
Extinguishment; Condonation (2000)
Arturo borrowed P500,000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300,000.00, his father died. When the administrator of his father’s estate requested payment of the balance of P200,000.00. Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father as evidenced by a notation at the back of his check payment for the P300,000.00 reading: “In full payment of the loan”. Will this be a valid defense in an action for collection?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation “in full payment of the loan” was written by Arturo’s father, there was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case, the notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. The condonation being implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effective. The defense of full payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself. It merely proves his intention in making that payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam v. CA, G.R. No. 104726, 11 February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation may be inferred. There being no condonation at all the defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo’s father, it amounted to an express condonation of the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article 748. There being no acceptance in writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. The defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by Arturo’s father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
Extinguishment; Extraordinary Inflation or Deflation (2001)
On July 1, 1998, Brian leased an office space in a building for a period of five years at a rental rate of P1,000.00 a month. The contract of lease contained the proviso that “in case of inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the monthly rental will automatically be increased or decreased depending on the devaluation or inflation of the peso to the dollar.” Starting March 1, 2001, the lessor increased the rental to P2,000 a month, on the ground of inflation proven by the fact that the exchange rate of the Philippine peso to the dollar had increased from P25.00=$1.00 to P50.00=$1.00. Brian refused to pay the increased rate and an action for unlawful detainer was filed against him. Will the action prosper? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will not prosper. Extraordinary inflation or deflation is defined as the sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. It does not necessarily refer to the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. Whether or not there exists an extraordinary inflation or deflation is for the courts to decide. There being no showing that the purchasing power of the peso had been reduced tremendously, there could be no inflation that would justify the increase in the amount of rental to be paid. Hence, Brian could refuse to pay the increased rate.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. The existence of inflation or deflation requires an official declaration by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will prosper. It is a given fact in the problem, that there was inflation, which caused the exchange rate to double. Since the contract itself authorizes the increase in rental in the event of an inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the doubling of the monthly rent is reasonable and is therefore a valid act under the very terms of the contract. Brian’s refusal to pay is thus a ground for ejectment.
Extinguishment; Loss (1994)
Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed to deliver the antique Marcedes Benz car Dino had purchased from Ben, which was—by agreement—due for delivery on December 31, 1993. Ben, in his answer to Dino’s complaint, said Dino’s claim has no basis for the suit, because as the car was being driven to be delivered to Dino on January 1, 1994, a reckless truck driver had rammed into the Mercedes Benz. The trial court dismissed Dino’s complaint, saying Ben’s obligation had indeed, been extinguished by force majeure.
Is the trial court correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No. Article 1262, New Civil Code provides, “An obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay.
b) The judgment of the trial court is incorrect. Loss of the thing due by fortuitous events or force majeure is a valid defense for a debtor only when the debtor has not incurred delay. Extinguishment of liability for fortuitous event requires that the debtor has not yet incurred any delay. In the present case, the debtor was in delay when the car was destroyed on January 1, 1993 since it was due for delivery on December 31, 1993. (Art. 1262 Civil Code)
c) It depends whether or not Ben the seller, was already in default at the time of the accident because a demand for him to deliver on due date was not complied with by him. That fact not having been given in the problem, the trial court erred in dismissing Dino’s complaint. Reason: There is default making him responsible for fortuitous events including the assumption of risk or loss.
If on the other hand Ben was not in default as no demand has been sent to him prior to the accident, then we must distinguish whether the price has been paid or not. If it has been paid, the suit for damages should prosper but only to enable the buyer to recover the price paid. It should be noted that Ben, the seller, must bear the loss on the principle of res perit domino. He cannot be held answerable for damages as the loss of the car was not imputable to his fault or fraud. In any case, he can recover the value of the car from the party whose negligence caused the accident. If no price has been paid at all, the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaint.
Extinguishment; Loss; Impossible Service (1993)
In 1971, Able Construction, Inc. entered into a contract with Tropical Home Developers, Inc. whereby the former would build for the latter the houses within its subdivision. The cost of each house, labor and materials included, was P100,000.00. Four hundred units were to be constructed within five years. In 1973, Able found that it could no longer continue with the job due to the increase in the price of oil and its derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiraling of prices of all commodities, including basic raw materials required for the construction of the houses. The cost of development had risen to unanticipated levels and to such a degree that the conditions and factors which formed the original basis of the contract had been totally changed. Able brought suit against Tropical Homes praying that the Court relieve it of its obligation.
Is Able Construction entitled to the relief sought?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Able Construction. Inc. is entitled to the relief sought under Article 1267, Civil Code. The law provides: “When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.”
Extinguishment; Novation (1994)
In 1978, Bobby borrowed Pl,000,000.00 from Chito payable in two years. The loan, which was evidenced by a promissory note, was secured by a mortgage on real property. No action was filed by Chito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage. But in 1991, Bobby, without receiving any amount from Chito, executed another promissory note which was worded exactly as the 1978 promissory note, except for the date thereof, which was the date of its execution.
1) Can Chito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994?
2) Can Chito foreclose the real estate mortgage if Bobby fails to make good his obligation under the 1991 promissory note?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes, Chito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994. Although the 1978 promissory note for P1 million payable two years later or in 1980 became a natural obligation after the lapse of ten (10) years, such natural obligation can be a valid consideration of a novated promissory note dated in 1991 and payable two years later, or in 1993.
All the elements of an implied real novation are present:
a) an old valid obligation;
b) a new valid obligation;
c) capacity of the parties;
d) animus novandi or intention to novate; and
e) The old and the new obligation should be incompatible with each other on all material points (Article 1292). The two promissory notes cannot stand together, hence, the period of prescription of ten (10) years has not yet lapsed.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2) No. The mortgage being an accessory contract prescribed with the loan. The novation of the loan, however, did not expressly include the mortgage, hence, the mortgage is extinguished under Article 1296 of the NCC. The contract
has been extinguished by the novation or extinction of the principal obligation insofar as third parties are concerned.
Extinguishment; Payment (1995)
In 1983 PHILCREDIT extended loans to Rivett-Strom Machineries, Inc. (RIVETTT-STROM), consisting of US$10 Million for the cost of machineries imported and directly paid by PHTLCREDIT, and 5 Million in cash payable in installments over a period of ten (10) years on the basis of the value thereof computed at the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Philippine peso at the time of payment.
RIVETT-STROM made payments on both loans which if based on the rate of exchange in 1983 would have fully settled the loans.
PHILCREDIT contends that the payments on both loans should be based on the rate of exchange existing at the time of payment, which rate of exchange has been consistently increasing, and for which reason there would still be a considerable balance on each loan.
Is the contention of PHILCREDIT correct? Discuss fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As regards the loan consisting of dollars, the contention of PHILCREDIT is correct. It has to be paid in Philippine currency computed on the basis of the exchange rate at the TIME OF PAYMENT of each installment, as held in Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337.As regards the P5 Million loan in Philippine pesos, PHILCREDIT is wrong. The payment thereof cannot be measured by the peso-dollar exchange rate. That will be violative of the Uniform Currency Act (RA, 529] which prohibits the payment of an obligation which, although to be paid in Philippine currency, is measured by a foreign currency. (Palanca v. CA,238 SCRA 593).
Liability; Lease; Joint Liability (2001)
Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one year. After one semester, three of them returned to their home country and the fourth transferred to a boarding house. Thelma discovered that they left unpaid telephone bills in the total amount of P80,000.00. The lease contract provided that the lessees shall pay for the telephone services in the leased premises. Thelma demanded that the fourth student pay the entire amount of the unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is willing to pay only one fourth of it. Who is correct? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207, CC). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any way, stipulate solidarity.
Liability; Solidary Liability (1998)
Joey, Jovy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P300,000.00 which has fallen due. The creditor has, however, condoned Jojo’s entire share in the debt. Since Jovy has become insolvent, the creditor makes a demand on Joey to pay the debt.
1) How much, if any, may Joey be compelled to pay?
2) To what extent, if at all, can Jojo be compelled by Joey to contribute to such payment?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in view of the remission of Jojo’s share by the creditor. (Art. 1219, Civil Code)
2. Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000 Art. 1217. par. 3, Civil Code provides. “When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.”
Since the insolvent debtor’s share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are only two remaining debtors – namely Joey and Jojo – these two shall share equally the burden of reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute P50.000.00.
Liability; Solidary Obligation (1992)
In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed with Y as solidary co-maker a promissory note in favor of A for the sum of P200,000.00. The loan was payable at P20,000.00 with interest monthly within the first week of each month beginning July 1988 until maturity in April 1989. To secure the payment of the loan. X put up as security a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla sedan. Because of failure of X and Y to pay the principal amount of the loan, the car was extrajudicially foreclosed. A acquired the car at A’s highest bid of P120,000.00 during the auction sale.
After several fruitless letters of demand against X and Y, A sued Y alone for the recovery of P80.000.00 constituting the deficiency. Y resisted the suit raising the following defenses: a) That Y should not be liable at all because X was not sued together with Y.
b) That the obligation has been paid completely by A’s acquisition of the car through “dacion en pago” or payment by cession.
c) That Y should not be held liable for the deficiency of P80,000.00 because he was not a co-mortgagor in the chattel mortgage of the car which contract was executed by X alone as owner and mortgagor.
d) That assuming that Y is liable, he should only pay the proportionate sum of P40,000.00.
Decide each defense with reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) This first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude further demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully paid.
(b) The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel mortgage is only given as a security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
(c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the extrajudicial demand against the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial demand against the surety. A suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.
(d) The fourth defense of Y is untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since Y incurred a solidary obligation with X.
(Arts. 1207, 1216. 1252 and 2047 Civil Code; Bicol Savings and Loan Associates vs. Guinhawa, 188 SCRA 642)
Liability; Solidary Obligation; Mutual Guaranty (2003)
A,B,C,D, and E made themselves solidarity indebted to X for the amount of P50,000.00. When X demanded payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the following grounds.
a) B is only 16 years old.
b) C has already been condoned by X
c) D is insolvent.
d) E was given by X an extension of 6 months without the consent of the other four co-debtors.
State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on his obligation to pay X, if such defenses are found to be true.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only for B’s share of P 10,000.00. A solidary debtor may avail himself of any defense which personally belongs to a solidary co-debtor, but only as to the share of that co- debtor.
(b) A may avail of the condonation by X of C’s share of P 10, 000.00. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him or pertain to his own share. With respect to those which personally belong to others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for which the latter are responsible. (Article 1222, NCC).
(c) A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D as a defense. Applying the principle of mutual guaranty among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the payment of D’s share and of all the other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail of the defense of D’s insolvency.
(d) The extension of six (6) months given by X to E may be availed of by A as a partial defense but only for the share of E, there is no novation of the obligation but only an act of liberality granted to E alone.
Loss of the thing due; Force Majeure (2000)
Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for cleaning. The jewelry shop undertook to return the ring by February 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the jewelry shop informed Kristina that the Job was not yet finished. They asked her to return five days later. On February 6, 1999, Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring, but she was informed that the same was stolen by a thief who entered the shop the night before. Kristina filed an action for damages against the jewelry shop which put up the defense of force majeure. Will the action prosper or not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. Since the defendant was already in default not having delivered the ring when delivery was demanded by plaintiff at due date, the defendant is liable for the loss of the thing and even when the loss was due to force majeure.
Non-Payment of Amortizations; Subdivision Buyer; When justified (2005)
Bernie bought on installment a residential subdivision lot from DEVLAND. After having faithfully paid the installments for 48 months, Bernie discovered that DEVLAND had failed to develop the subdivision in accordance with the approved plans and specifications within the time frame in the plan. He thus wrote a letter to DEVLAND informing it that he was stopping payment. Consequently, DEVLAND cancelled the sale and wrote Bernie, informing him that his payments are forfeited in its favor.
a) Was the action of DEVLAND proper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action of DEVLAND is not proper. Under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Decree, non-payment of amortizations by the buyer is justified if non-payment is due to the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the limit for complying. (Eugenio v. Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, January 22,1996)
b) Discuss the rights of Bernie under the circumstances.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under P.D. No. 957, a cancellation option is available to Bernie. If Bernie opts to cancel the contract, DEVLAND must reimburse Bernie the total amount paid and the amortizations interest, excluding delinquency interest, plus interest at legal rate. (Eugenio v. Drilon,G.R.No.109404, January 22,1996)
c) Supposing DEVLAND had fully developed the subdivision but Bernie failed to pay further installments after 4 years due to business reverses .Discuss the rights and obligations of the parties.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In this case, pursuant to Section 24 of P.D. No. 957, R.A. No. 6552 otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act, shall govern. Under Section 3 thereof, Bernie is entitled: 1) to pay without additional interest the unpaid installments due within a grace period of four (4) months or one month for every year of installment paid; 2) if the contract is cancelled, Bernie is entitled to the refund of the cash surrender value equal to 50% of the total payments made.
DEVLAND on the other hand has the right to cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by Bernie of notice of cancellation. DEVLAND is however obliged to refund to
Bernie 50% of the total payments made. (Rillo v. Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 125347, June 19,1997)
Period; Suspensive Period (1991)
In a deed of sale of a realty, it was stipulated that the buyer would construct a commercial building on the lot while the seller would construct a private passageway bordering the lot. The building was eventually finished but the seller failed to complete the passageway as some of the squatters, who were already known to be there at the time they entered into the contract, refused to vacate the premises. In fact, prior to its execution, the seller filed ejectment cases against the squatters.
The buyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. The defense is that the obligation to construct the passageway should be with a period which, incidentally, had not been fixed by them, hence, the need for fixing a judicial period. Will the action for specific performance of the buyer against the seller prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art. 1197 of the Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court maybe asked to fix it taking into consideration the probable contemplation of the parties. Before the period is fixed, an action for specific performance is premature.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It has been held in Borromeo vs. CA ( 47 SCRA 69), that the Supreme Court allowed the simultaneous filing of action to fix the probable contemplated period of the parties where none is fixed in the agreement if this would avoid multiplicity of suits. In addition, technicalities must be subordinated to substantial justice.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action for specific performance will not prosper. The filing of the ejectment suit by the seller was precisely in compliance with his obligations and should not, therefore, be faulted if no decision has yet been reached by the Court on the matter.
From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS in CIVIL LAW by the UP LAW COMPLEX and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS.
