Opulencia v. CA
G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998
Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a “CONTRACT TO SELL” of a lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meters. Plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. However the petitioner put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the downpayment received from private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval is valid
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and consequent “need of cash.” These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. The Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner’s offer to sell is contingent on the “complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.” Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate.
