RULE AS TO WHO SHOULD
BE CRIMINALLY CHARGED
The settled rule is that the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. As the officer authorized to direct and control the prosecution of all criminal actions, the prosecutor is tasked to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. (People v. Esparas; GR 120034, July 10, 1998)
WHEN THERE IS A WAIVER
OF WARRANTLESS ARREST
The appellants are now precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. The appellants never protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller, after identifying himself as a police officer, opened the tin can loaded in the appellants’ vehicle and found eight (8) bundles. And when Faller opened one of the bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The NBI later confirmed the eight (8) bundles to be positive for marijuana. Again, the appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. We have ruled in a long line of cases that:
“When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631). The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.”
The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure in question by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial. (People v. Correa; GR 119246, Jan. 30, ’98)
WHEN USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE
IN DRUG CASES OR ANY OTHER
CASE IS NOT AGGRAVATING
Simply stated, the motor vehicle which was used to transport prohibited drugs was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime since such act of transporting constitutes the crime itself, punishable under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. That a motor vehicle was used in committing the crime is merely incidental to the act of transporting prohibited drugs. The use of a motor vehicle is inherent in the crime of transporting as it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof; hence, such use is not an aggravating circumstance. (People v. Correa)
CASES WHEN WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS ALLOWED
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
(People v. Menguin; GR 120915, Apr. 13, ’98)
CASES WHEN SEARCH WITHOUT
A WARRANT WAS VALID
In People v. Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta’s alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their “business address”. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt, the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta’s identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be “high” on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually “high” on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit’s identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada’s constitutional right.
People v. Solayao, applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals. In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to “stop and frisk” accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General’s contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful. On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her. (People v. Menguin)
