RA NO. 6539:
AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING
A card holder who abandons or surreptitiously leaves the place of employment, business or residence stated in his application for credit card, without informing the credit card company of the place where he could actually be found, if at the time of such abandonment or surreptitious leaving, the outstanding and unpaid balance is past due for at least ninety (90) days and is more that ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), shall be prima facie presumed to have used his credit card with intent to defraud.
The law provides for sixteen (16) prohibited acts which refer to the production, use, possession of or trafficking in unauthorized or counterfeit access devices. It also includes acts deemed fraudulent that increase the amount involved in commercial transactions using access devices. Obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access devise with intent to defraud or gain, and fleeing thereafter.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Noel Santos y Crispino and Feliciano Funcion alias JON-JON, accused, G.R. No. 127500, June 8, 2000.
“Carnapping,” as defined by Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, by using force upon things. By the amendment in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now makes clear, among others, the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of he Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution not only has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of Ruel Morales but more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of he culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” Needless to say, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Elgin Latayada, (at large), appellant, G.R. No. 146865. February 18, 2004.
Under Section 2 of RA 6539, carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent; or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons; or with the use of force upon things . . . RA 7659 introduced three amendments to the last clause of Section 14: (1) the change of the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase “in the commission of the carnapping” to “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. “The Court has held that the third that the third amendment clarifies the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, in the third amendment clarifies the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, in the same way, that robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons is treated under paragraphs 1 to 4 Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Hence, the prosecution must prove not only that the essential requisites of carnapping were present; but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit, and that the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” In the present case, the prosecution had the burden of proving that 1) appellant took the motorcycle; 2) his original criminal design was carnapping; 3) he killed Payla; and 4) the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof”. It is indisputed that the motorcycle driven by Payla had been taken without his consent on October 29, 1995, and recovered days later in a cannibalized condition. The elements of taking and intent to gain were thus established. The prosecution also proved it was appellant who had killed him. It failed, however, to discharge its burden of proving the two other requisites of carnapping.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelee vs. Gregorion Mejia y Villafania, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito, accused-appellants, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 & 119407. July 7, 1997
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993 is applicable to these cases because the crimes were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of RA No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Three amendments have this been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase “in te commission of the carnapping” to “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof”. The latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-à-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of carnapping in an aggravated from. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended Section 14, the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Luisito D. Bustinera, appellant.
“Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis aninternal act, presumed from unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fielmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was “temporary” and for “joy ride”, the Court sustains as the better view that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to certain place, a learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it “hurt de uso”. (underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail or, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary, (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy, the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency – not the courts.
Leonardo Paat, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 111107, 10 January 1997)
“… the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes and unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Xxx.
