SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE NOT APPLICABLE
IF PENALTY IS RECLUSION PERPETUA,
LIFE IMPRISONMENT OR DEATH
As aforesaid, however, accused Ricky Galit and Raquel Tagalog did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court. Neither did the People question the suspension of their sentence. The benefits of suspension of sentence are not available where the youthful offender has been convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. The last paragraph of section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1210, which amended certain provisions of P.D. 603, provides:
“The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.” (Par. 4, Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1179, as amended by P.D. No. 1210; emphasis supplied)
(Pp. v. Galit, supra.)
EVERY ACCUSED IS PRESUMED TO BE SANE AT THE TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
The law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Since insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, an accused is presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the crime in the absence of positive evidence to show that he had lost his reason or was demented prior to or during the perpetration of the crime. (Pp. v. Cordova, supra.)
FAILURE OF DEFENSE TO ASK FOR
SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT
NEGATES INSANITY
Appellant Eduardo Cordova did not even ask for the suspension of his arraignment on the ground that he was suffering from insanity. Paragraph (a), Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the arraignment of an accused who appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto, shall be suspended. In the case at bar, Eduardo Cordova even took the witness stand to testify. (Pp. V. Cordova, supra.)
CHILD & YOUTH WELFARE CODE,
NOT APPLICABLE TO DEATH OR
RECLUSION PERPETUA SENTENCE
The Child and Youth Welfare Code does not apply to those convicted of offenses punishable by death, or reclusion perpetua (Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended by Presidential Decree N. 603, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1179 and 1210). The fact is Bolioc is now twenty-three years old. He is not entitled to a suspended sentence. He is entitled to a two-degree reduction of the penalty (Art. 68, RPC). (Pp. V. Mendez; GR L-48131; 5/30/83)
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE; CANNOT
BE AVAILED OF WHERE OFFENDER IS ALREADY OVER 21 YEARS OLD AT THE
TIME OF PROMULGATION OF HIS SENTENCE
It is true that Venancio Villanueva was a youthful offender as defined by Art. 189 because he was under 21 years of age when he committed the offense on February 22, 1974. However, when he was sentenced on July 30, 1975, he was over 21 years old and under the terms of Art. 192 (as well as Art. 197) he was no longer entitled to suspension of sentence. (Villanueva v. CFI; GR L-45798, 12/15/82)
WHEN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603
MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Where P.D. 603 is more favorable to the accused in that the sentence against them may he suspended, said Decree may be given retroactive effect, not only with the end in view of giving force and effect to the laudable policies for which the P.D. otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code was promulgated, hut also in the light of the provisions of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Garcia; GR L-45280-81, 6/11/81)
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603;
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
OF THE COURT WHEN YOUTHFUL
OFFENDER IS RETURNED AFTER
REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY
The trial court has two alternative courses of action with respect to a youthful offender whose sentence it had suspended and who is returned to the court upon his reaching the age of majority. These are: (1) to dismiss the case and order the final discharge of said offender; or (2) to pronounce the judgment of conviction. In plain and simple language, it is either dismissal or sentence. (Pp. V. Garcia; supra.)
CIVIL LIABILITY OF YOUTHFUL
OFFENDER, DEFINED
The civil liability for damages referred to is apparently that obligation created by or arising from the crime, otherwise known as ex delicto the imposition of which is mandated by Articles 100, 104(3), 107 and 345(1) of the Revised Penal Code, (People vs. Peña, L-36434, December 20, 1977, 80 SCRA 589, 599) and is based upon a finding of the guilt of the accused. (Pp. V. Garcia, supra.)
JURISPRUDENCE:
PEOPLE VS. ABELLO, G.R. NO. 151952, MARCH 25, 2009
More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which reads:
(a) “Children” refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]
The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a “child” as one who is below 18 years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.
PEOPLE VS. ADELADO RAGADAO ANGUAC, G.R. NO. 176744, June 5, 2009
Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 refers to engaging in or promoting, facilitating, or inducing child prostitution. Sec. 5(b), on the other hand, relates to offenders who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse.The informations charged accused-appellant with having sexual congress with AAA through force, threats, and intimidation. These allegations more properly fall under a charge under Sec. 5(b).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABAY, G.R. NO. 177752, FEBRUARY 24, 2009
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
