ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY
OF FUNDS ESSENTIAL IN BP 22
Lim Lao
VS
CA
6/20/97
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. There is a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. It is important to stress, however, that this is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary.
WHEN LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND
LACK OF POWER TO FUND THE
CHECKS IN CASES OF BP 22 A DEFENSE
Lim Lao
VS
CA
6/20/97
After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court finds that Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she affixed her signature to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were issued, and even at the time the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
The scope of petitioner’s duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporation’s checks; her duties were limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch. Under the organizational structure of Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was the sole responsibility of the Treasury Department.
LACK OF ADEQUATE NOTICE OF
DISHONOR, A DEFENSE
Lim Lao
VS
CA
6/20/97
There can be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by the petitioner.
The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The trial court itself found absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina Lim Lao by the drawee bank based on the unrebutted testimony of Ocampo “(t)hat the checks bounced when presented with the drawee bank but she did not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim Lao as there was no need to inform them as the corporation was in distress.” The Court of Appeals affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, this finding is binding on this Court.
THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN CASES OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 WAS NOT DELETED
Bernardo
VS
People
G.R. No. 166980
April 3, 2007
A word on the modified penalty imposed by the RTC. Contrary to its reasoning, the penalty of imprisonment in cases of violation of B.P. 22 was not deleted. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penaltie provided for in B.P. 22.
THE 90-DAY PERIOD IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
Arceo, Jr.
VS
People
G.R. No. 142641
July 17, 2009
In Wong v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22
Where a creditor has collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks, charging the debtor with a criminal offense under the Bouncing checks Law – a long time after the collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable consideration – is not a Violation of BP 22.
(Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007)
While indeed the gravamen of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of issuing worthless checks, considering that, in this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the check even before respondent filed his complaint, we believe and so hold that no injury was caused to the public interests or the banking system, or specifically to herein respondent. –While indeed the gravamen of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of issuing worthless checks, nonetheless, courts should not apply the law strictly or harshly. Its spirit and purpose must be considered.
In Lozano v. Martinez (146 SCRA 323) we held that the Bouncing Checks Law is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing worthless checks or those that end up being dishonored for payment because of the injury it causes to the public interests. In Sia v. People (428 SCRA 206) we explained that the law is intended to safeguard the interests of the banking system and the legitimate checking account users.
Considering that petitioner had paid the amount of the check even before respondent filed his complaint, we believe and so hold that no injury was caused to the public interests or the banking system, or specifically to herein respondent.
(Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007)
BP 22 INCLUDES THE MAKING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK BY ONE WHO HAS NO ACCOUNT WITH A BANK
The law is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the making and issuance of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such account has already been closed when the check was presented for payment. As the Court in Lozano explained: “The effect of the issuance of a wortheless checks transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.” Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues a worthless checks against insufficient funds or a closed account in the drawee bank, there is likewise, every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latter’s consent, which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank. (Ruiz vs. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005)
