Conspiracy (1997)
A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves with knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group’s lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house. Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the knowledge of the others. A stealthily entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A exiled from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away.
G died. F survived.
Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former was completely unaware of said killing.
For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F’s escape. D, however, although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended toward the same end (People vs. Tomoro, et al, 44 Phil. 38).
In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F.
Conspiracy; Avoidance of Greater Evil (2004)
BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim’s son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun. FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder.
In his defense, AA invoked the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that by preventing ST from shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil.
Will AA’s defense prosper? Reason briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, AA’s defense will not prosper because obviously there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA, such that the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The act of ST, the victim’s son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST’s act to defend his father’s life, cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act.
What AA did was to stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their criminal objective of stabbing FT.
Conspiracy; Co-Conspirator (1998)
Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel’s house, Juan will hide behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the criminal liability of Arturo, if any.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal liability. Arturo’s liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only (People vs .Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People vs. Medrano, 114 SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually participate in the shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing of Joel. Conspiracy itself is not punishable unless expressly provided by law and this is not true in the case of Murder. A co-conspirator must perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy.
Conspiracy; Common Felonious Purpose (1994)
At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Fauna Street, Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide.
Is there conspiracy in this case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims. The existence of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders acted in commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal design to inflict harm on their victims.
Conspiracy; Complex Crime with Rape (1996)
Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o’clock in the morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo’s house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo’s daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family.
a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit? Explain.
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the latter’s house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did the four commit? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place “distant from the house” where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995)
b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide … (implied: there is still conspiracy)
Conspiracy; Flight to Evade Apprehension (2003)
A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C’s mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter’s money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B’s spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable.
The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness.
Conspiracy; Flight to Evade Apprehension (2003)
A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C’s mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter’s money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B’s spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable.
The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness.
Conspiracy; Implied Conspiracy (1998)
What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be deemed the act of all.
Conspiracy; Implied Conspiracy; Effects (2003)
State the concept of “implied conspiracy” and give its legal effects.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An “IMPLIED CONSPIRACY” is one which is only inferred or deduced from the manner the participants in the commission of crime carried out its execution. Where the offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime, meaning that their acts are coordinated or synchronized in a way indicative that they are pursuing a common criminal objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy and their criminal liability shall be collective, not individual.
The legal effects of an “implied conspiracy” are:
a) Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime will be considered conspirators;
b) Only those who participated by criminal acts in the commission of the crime will be considered as co- conspirators; and
c) Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission of the crime, without any act of criminal participation, shall not render one criminally liable as co-conspirator.
Criminal Liability: Destructive Arson (2000)
A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X, who happened to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four culprits peppered the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed X’s room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and nobody was hit or injured during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any crime? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. A, B. C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X with the use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was intended,
Criminal Liability: Felonious Act of Scaring (1996)
Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from Bicol and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are passengers of the bus, jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the pavement of the road, were ran over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus tailing the Superlines Bus.
Can Alexander be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely unaware that the two jumped out of the bus? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of running was the proximate cause of the victim’s death. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (US vs.Valdez, 41 Phil. 1497; People vs. Apra, 27 SCRA 1037)
Criminal Liability: Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (1996)
Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter was able to parry it with his hand, causing upon him a two- inch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not able to hack Anacleto further because three policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he did not drop his bolo. Vicente was accordingly charged by the police at the prosecutor’s office for attempted homicide. Twenty- five days later, while the preliminary investigation was in progress, Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of symptoms of tetanus infection on the two-inch wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the following day.
Can Vicente be eventually charged with homicide for the death of Anacleto? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause. Vicente’s felonious act of causing a two-inch wound on Anacleto’s right palm may still be regarded as the proximate cause of the latter’s death because without such wound, no tetanus infection could develop from the victim’s right palm, and without
such tetanus infection the victim would not have died with it.
Criminal Liability: Impossible Crimes (2000)
a. What is an impossible crime?
b. Is an impossible crime really a crime?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or property, were if not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC)
2. No, an impossible crime is not really a crime. It is only so-called because the act gives rise to criminal liability. But actually, no felony is committed. The accused is to be punished for his criminal tendency or propensity although no crime was committed.
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act of Scaring (2001)
Maryjane had two suitors – Felipe and Cesar. She did not openly show her preference but on two occasions, accepted Cesar’s invitation to concerts by Regine and Pops. Felipe was a working student and could only ask Mary to see a movie which was declined. Felipe felt insulted and made plans to get even with Cesar by scaring him off somehow. One day, he entered Cesar’s room in their boarding house and placed a rubber snake which appeared to be real in Cesar’s backpack. Because Cesar had a weak heart, he suffered a heart attack upon opening his backpack and seeing the snake. Cesar died without regaining consciousness. The police investigation resulted in pinpointing Felipe as the culprit and he was charged with Homicide for Cesar’s death. In his defense, Felipe claimed that he did not know about Cesar’s weak heart and that he only intended to play a practical joke on Cesar.
Is Felipe liable for the death of Cesar or will his defense prosper? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Felipe is liable for the death of Cesar but he shall be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that which was committed (Art. 13, par. 3, RPC).
When Felipe intruded into Cesar’s room without the latter’s consent and took liberty with the letter’s backpack where he placed the rubber snake. Felipe was already committing a felony. And any act done by him while committing a felony is no less wrongful, considering that they were part of “plans to get even with Cesar”.
Felipe’s claim that he intended only “to play a practical joke on Cesar” does not persuade, considering that they are not friends but in fact rivals in courting Maryjane. This case is parallel to the case of People vs. Pugay, et al.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Felipe is not liable because the act of frightening another is not a crime. What he did may be wrong, but not all wrongs amount to a crime. Because the act which caused the death of Cesar is not a crime, no criminal liability may arise therefrom.
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act of Scaring (2005)
Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock of a neighbor and reported him to the police. Thereafter, Gaston, while driving a car saw Belle crossing the street. Incensed that Belle had reported him, Gaston decided to scare her by trying to make it appear that he was about to run her over. He revved the engine of his car and drove towards her but he applied the brakes. Since the road was slippery at that time, the vehicle skidded and hit Belle causing her death.
Was gaston criminally liable?
What is the liability of Gaston? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Gaston is liable for Belle’s death because even though Gaston has no intent to kill Belle rather just to scare Belle. “To scare” does not indicate intent to kill. However, under Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides in part that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In other words, the rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (US vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 1497; People vs. Apra, 27 SCRA 1037)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Gaston is liable for Belle’s death because by his acts of revving the engine of his car and driving towards Belle is felonious, and such felonious act was the proximate cause of the vehicle to skid and hit Belle, resulting in the latter’s death. Stated otherwise, the death of Belle was the direct, natural and logical consequence of Gaston’s felonious act. (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037)
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Immediate Cause (2003)
The conduct of wife A aroused the ire of her husband B.
Incensed with anger almost beyond his control, B could not help but inflict physical injuries on A. Moments after B started hitting A with his fists, A suddenly complained of severe chest pains. B, realizing that A was indeed in serious trouble, immediately brought her to the hospital. Despite efforts to alleviate A’s pains, she died of heart attack. It turned out that she had been suffering from a lingering heart ailment. What crime, if any, could B be held guilty of?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B could be held liable for parricide because his act of hitting his wife with fist blows and therewith inflicting physical injuries on her, is felonious. A person committing a felonious act incurs criminal liability although the wrongful consequence is different from what he intended (Art. 4, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
Although A died of heart attack, the said attack was generated by B’s felonious act of hitting her with his fists. Such felonious act was the immediate cause of the heart attack, having materially contributed to and hastened A’s death. Even though B may have acted without intent to kill his wife, lack of such intent is of no moment when the victim dies. However, B may be given the mitigating circumstance of having acted without intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code).
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (1994)
Bhey eloped with Scott. Whereupon, Bhey’s father, Robin, and brother, Rustom, went to Scott’s house. Upon reaching the house, Rustom inquired from Scott about his sister’s whereabouts, while Robin shouted and threatened to kill Scott. The latter then went downstairs but Rustom held his (Scott’s) waist. Meanwhile Olive, the elder sister of Scott, carrying her two-month old child, approached Rustom and Scott to pacify them. Olive attempted to remove Rustom’s hand from Scott’s waist. But Rustom pulled Olive’s hand causing her to fall over her baby. The baby then died moments later.
Is Rustom criminally liable for the death of the child?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Rustom is criminally liable for the death of the child because his felonious act was the proximate cause of such death. It was Rustom’s act of pulling Olive’s hand which caused the latter to fall on her baby. Had It not been for said act of Rustom, which is undoubtedly felonious (at least slight coercion) there was no cause for Olive to fall over her baby. In short, Rustom’s felonious act is the cause of the evil caused. Any person performing a felonious act is criminally liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof although different from what he intended (Art.4, par. 1, RPC; People vs. Pugay, et al, GR No. 74324, Nov. 18, 1988).
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (1997)
While the crew of a steamer prepared to raise anchor at the Pasig River, A, evidently impatient with the progress of work, began to use abusive language against the men. B, one of the members of the crew, remonstrated saying that they could work best if they were not insulted. A took B’s attitude as a display of insubordination and, rising in a rage, moved towards B wielding a big knife and threatening to stab B. At the instant when A was only a few feet from B, the latter, apparently believing himself to be in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water, disappeared beneath the surface, and drowned.
May A be held criminally liable for the death of B?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. A can be held criminally liable for the death of B, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497 where the victim who was threatened by the accused with a knife, jumped into the river but because of the strong current or because he did not know how to swim, he drowned, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for homicide of the accused because, if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for the homicide in case death results by drowning.
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (1999)
During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits happened to fire his gun upward in the ceiling without meaning to kill anyone. The owner of the house who was hiding thereat was hit and killed as a result.
The defense theorized that the killing was a mere accident and was not perpetrated in connection with, or for purposes of, the robbery.
Will you sustain the defense? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I will not sustain the defense. The act being felonious and the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the offender is liable therefore although it may not be intended or different from what he intended.
The offender shall be prosecuted for the composite crime of robbery with homicide, whether the killing was intentional or accidental, as long as the killing was on occasion of the robbery.
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (2001)
Luis Cruz was deeply hurt when his offer of love was rejected by his girlfriend Marivella one afternoon when he visited her. When he left her house, he walked as if he was sleepwalking so much so that a teenage snatcher was able to grab his cell phone and flee without being chased by Luis. At the next LRT station, he boarded one of the coaches bound for Baclaran. While seated, he happened to read a newspaper left on the seat and noticed that the headlines were about the sinking of the Super Ferry while on its way to Cebu. He went over the list of missing passengers who were presumed dead and came across the name of his grandfather who had raised him from childhood after he was orphaned. He was shocked and his mind went blank for a few minutes, after which he ran amuck and, using his balisong, started stabbing at the passengers who then scampered away, with three of them Jumping out of the train and landing on the road below. All the three passengers died later of their injuries at the hospital.
Is Luis liable for the death of the three passengers who jumped out of the moving train? State your reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he was committing a felony when he started stabbing at the passengers and such wrongful act was the proximate cause of said passengers’ jumping out of the train; hence their deaths.
Under Article 4, Revised Penal Code, any person committing a felony shall incur criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In this case, the death of the three passengers was the direct, natural and logical consequence of Luis’ felonious act which created an immediate sense of danger in the minds of said passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it by jumping out of the train. (People vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1O37; U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497)
Criminal Liability; Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (2004)
On his way home from office, ZZ rode in a jeepney. Subsequently, XX boarded the same jeepney. Upon reaching a secluded spot in QC, XX pulled out a grenade from his bag and announced a hold-up. He told ZZ to surrender his watch, wallet and cellphone. Fearing for his life, ZZ jumped out of the vehicle. But as he fell, his head hit the pavement, causing his instant death . Is XX liable for ZZ’s death? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, XX is liable for ZZ’s death because his acts of pulling out a grenade and announcing a hold-up, coupled with a demand for the watch, wallet and cellphone of ZZ is felonious, and such felonious act was the proximate cause of ZZ’s jumping out of the jeepney, resulting in the latter’s death. Stated otherwise, the death of ZZ was the direct, natural and logical consequence of XX’s felonious act which created an immediate sense of danger in the mind of ZZ who tried to avoid such danger by jumping out of the jeepney (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037).
Criminal Liability; Impossible Crime (2004)
OZ and YO were both courting their co-employee, SUE.
Because of their bitter rivalry, OZ decided to get rid of YO by poisoning him. OZ poured a substance into YO’s coffee thinking it was arsenic. It turned out that the substance was white sugar substitute known as Equal. Nothing happened to YO after he drank the coffee. What criminal liability did OZ incur, if any? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
OZ incurred criminal liability for an impossible crime of murder. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4, par. 2, RFC).
In the problem given, the impossibility of accomplishing the crime of murder, a crime against persons, was due to the employment of ineffectual means which OZ thought was poison. The law imputes criminal liability to the offender although no crime resulted, only to suppress his criminal propensity because subjectively, he is a criminal though objectively, no crime was committed.
Criminal Liability; Impossible Crimes (1994)
JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed with automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at her room. Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she attended a prayer meeting that evening in another barangay in Laurel.
JP, et al, were charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court at Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding them guilty of attempted murder.
If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa’s absence from the house is a physical impossibility which renders the crime intended Inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of attempted or frustrated felony (Intod vs.CA, 215 SCRA 52).
Criminal Liability: Impossible Crimes (1998)
Buddy always resented his classmate, Jun. One day.
Buddy planned to kill Jun by mixing poison in his lunch.
Not knowing where he can get poison, he approached another classmate, Jerry to whom he disclosed his evil plan. Because he himself harbored resentment towards Jun, Jerry gave Buddy a poison, which Buddy placed on Jun’s food. However, Jun did not die because, unknown to both Buddy and Jerry, the poison was actually powdered milk.
1, What crime or crimes, if any, did Jerry and Buddy commit?
2. Suppose that, because of his severe allergy to powdered milk, Jun had to be hospitalized for 10 days for ingesting it. Would your answer to the first question be the same?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Jerry and Buddy are liable for the so-called “impossible crime” because, with intent to kill, they tried to poison Jun and thus perpetrate Murder, a crime against persons. Jun was not poisoned only because the would-be killers were unaware that what they mixed with the food of Jun
was powdered milk, not poison. In short, the act done with criminal intent by Jerry and Buddy, would have constituted a crime against persons were it not for the inherent inefficacy of the means employed. Criminal liability is incurred by them although no crime resulted, because their act of trying to poison Jun is criminal.
2. No, the answer would not be the same as above. Jerry and Buddy would be liable instead for less serious physical injuries for causing the hospitalization and medical attendance for 10 days to Jun. Their act of mixing with the food eaten by Jun the matter which required such medical attendance, committed with criminal intent, renders them liable for the resulting injury.
Criminal Liability; Impossible Crimes; Kidnapping (2000)
Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note demanding P500,000.00 from Carla’s parents in exchange for Carla’s freedom. Enrique sent the ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom note was received by Carla’s parents, Enrique’s hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was rescued while Enrique was arrested and incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note was not received by Carla’s parents, the investigating prosecutor merely filed a case of “Impossible Crime to Commit Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the prosecutor correct? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the prosecutor is not correct in filing a case for “impossible crime to commit kidnapping” against Enrique. Impossible crimes are limited only to acts which when performed would be a crime against persons or property. As kidnapping is a crime against personal security and not against persons or property, Enrique could not have incurred an “impossible crime” to commit kidnapping. There is thus no impossible crime of kidnapping.
Mala in Se vs. Mala Prohibita (1997)
1. Distinguish between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita.
2. May an act be malum in se and be, at the same time, malum prohibitum?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Crimes mala in se are felonious acts committed by dolo or culpa as defined in the Revised Penal Code. Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense, except when the crime results from criminal negligence. On the other hand, crimes mala prohibita are those considered wrong only because they are prohibited by statute. They constitute violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum at the same time. In People v. Sunico, et aL. (CA 50 OG 5880) it was held that the omission or failure of election inspectors and poll clerks to include a voter’s name in the registry list of voters is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard it is considered as malum in se. Since it is punished under a special law (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is considered malum prohibitum.
Mala in Se vs. Mala Prohibita (1999)
Distinguish ” mala in se” from ” mala prohibita.”
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In “mala in se”, the acts constituting the crimes are inherently evil, bad or wrong, and hence involves the moral traits of the offender; while in “mala prohibita”, the acts constituting the crimes are not inherently bad, evil or wrong but prohibited and made punishable only for public good. And because the moral trait of the offender is Involved in “mala in se”. Modifying circumstances, the offender’s extent of participation in the crime, and the degree of accomplishment of the crime are taken into account in imposing the penalty: these are not so in “mala prohibita” where criminal liability arises only when the acts are consummated.
Mala in Se vs. Mala Prohibita (2001)
Briefly state what essentially distinguishes a crime mala prohibita from a crime mala in se.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In crimes mala prohibita, the acts are not by nature wrong, evil or bad. They are punished only because there is a law prohibiting them for public good, and thus good faith or lack of criminal intent in doing the prohibited act is not a defense.
In crimes mala in se, the acts are by nature wrong, evil or bad, and so generally condemned. The moral trait of the offender is involved; thus, good faith or lack of criminal Intent on the part of the offender is a defense, unless the crime is the result of criminal negligence. Correspondingly, modifying circumstances are considered in punishing the offender.
Mala in Se vs. Mala Prohibita (2003)
Distinguish, in their respective concepts and legal implications, between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibits.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In concept: Crimes mala in se are those where the acts or omissions penalized are inherently bad, evil, or wrong that they are almost universally condemned.
Crimes mala prohibita are those where the acts penalized are not inherently bad, evil, or wrong but prohibited by law for public good, public welfare or interest and whoever violates the prohibition are penalized.
In legal implications:In crimes mala in se, good faith or lack of criminal intent/ negligence is a defense, while in crimes mala prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a defense; it is enough that the prohibition was voluntarily violated.
Also, criminal liability is generally incurred in crimes mala in se even when the crime is only attempted or frustrated, while in crimes mala prohibita, criminal liability is generally incurred only when the crime is consummated.
Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are appreciated in imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala prohibita, such circumstances are not appreciated unless the special law has adopted the scheme or scale of penalties under the Revised Penal Code.
Mala Prohibita; Actual Injury Required (2000)
Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr. Rico Yto, a private Individual, went to the office of Mr. Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented themselves as agents of Moonglow Commercial Trading, an Importer of children’s clothes and toys. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs the necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration covering Moonglow’s shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a commercial invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn Import Duty Declaration which declared the shipment as children’s toys, the taxes and duties of which were computed at P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the aforementioned documents with the Manila International Container Port. However, before the shipment was released, a spot check was conducted by Customs Senior Agent James Bandido, who discovered that the contents of the van (shipment) were not children’s toys as declared in the shipping documents but 1,000 units of video cassette recorders with taxes and duties computed at P600,000.00. A hold order and warrant of seizure and detention were then issued by the District Collector of Customs. Further investigation showed that Moonglow is non-existent. Consequently, Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto were charged with and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which makes it unlawful among others, for public officers to cause any undue Injury to any party, including the Government. In the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In their motion for reconsideration, the accused alleged that the decision was erroneous because the crime was not consummated but was only at an attempted stage, and that in fact the Government did not suffer any undue injury.
a) Is the contention of both accused correct? Explain.
b) Assuming that the attempted or frustrated stage of the violation charged is not punishable, may the accused be nevertheless convicted for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code under the facts of the case? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the contention of the accused that the crime was not consummated is correct, RA. 3019 is a special law punishing acts mala prohibita. As a rule, attempted violation of a special law is not punished. Actual injury is required.
Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, a complex crime. …
Malum in Se vs. Malum Prohibitum (2005)
Distinguish malum in se from malum prohibitum.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In crimes malum in se, an act is by nature wrong, evil or bad, and so generally condemned. The moral trait of the offender is involved; thus, good faith or lack of criminal Intent on the part of the offender is a defense, unless the crime is the result of criminal negligence. Correspondingly, modifying circumstances are considered in punishing the offender.
In crimes mala prohibitum, an act is not by nature wrong, evil or bad. Yet, it is punished because there is a law prohibiting them for public good, and thus good faith or lack of criminal intent in doing the prohibited act is not a defense.
Motive vs. Intent (1996)
1. Distinguish intent from motive in Criminal Law.
2. May crime be committed without criminal intent?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such results. Motive is not an essential element of a felony and need not be proved for purpose of conviction, while intent is an essential element of felonies by dolo.
2. Yes, a crime may be committed without criminal intent if such is a culpable felony, wherein Intent is substituted by negligence or imprudence, and also in a malum prohibitum or if an act is punishable by special law.
Motive vs. Intent (1999)
1. Distinguish “motive” from “intent”.
2. When is motive relevant to prove a case? When is it not necessary to be established? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. “Motive ” is the moving power which impels a person to do an act for a definite result; while “intent” is the purpose for using a particular means to bring about a desired result. Motive is not an element of a crime but intent is an element of intentional crimes. Motive, if attending a crime, always precede the intent.
2. Motive is relevant to prove a case when there is doubt as to the identity of the offender or when the act committed gives rise to variant crimes and there is the need to determine the proper crime to be imputed to the offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive when the offender is positively identified or the criminal act did not give rise to variant crimes.
Motive vs. Intent (2004)
Distinguish clearly but briefly between intent and motive in the commission of an offense.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Intent is the purpose for using a particular means to achieve the desired result; while motive is the moving power which impels a person to act for a definite result. Intent is an ingredient of dolo or malice and thus an element of deliberate felonies; while motive is not an element of a crime but only considered when the identity of the offender is in doubt.
Motive; Proof thereof; Not Essential; Conviction (2006)
Motive is essential in the determination of the commis- sion of a crime and the liabilities of the perpetrators.
What are the instances where proof of motive is not essential or required to justify conviction of an accused? Give at least 3 instances.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. When there is an eyewitness or positive identification of the accused.
2. When the accused admitted or confessed to the commission of the crime.
3. In crimes mala prohibita.
4. In direct assault, when the victim, who is a person in authority or agent of a person in authority was attacked in the actual performance of his duty (Art.
148, Revised Penal Code).
5. In crimes committed through reckless imprudence.
From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS in CRIMINAL LAW by the UP LAW COMPLEX and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS.